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SETTING THE STANDARD FOR “NEUTRAL”
ARBITRATORS: THE RISK OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY
AND THE IMPACT OF MONSTER ENERGY V. CITY
BEVERAGES
William Schmelter*
The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and particularly
arbitration, has grown in tandem with the delays and costs of litigating
in overburdened state and federal court systems, but that rise in
popularity has not come without a cost. Although arbitration may often
be a preferable alternative to a full-blown court trial, the inconsistency
and insufficiency of existing disclosure requirements for arbitrators in
many states limits the ability of parties to make an informed evaluation
as to the risk or existence of potential bias. The recent Monster Energy
case out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
begun to change the landscape for disclosure requirements for
arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act, but unless state
legislatures agree to implement disclosure requirements for arbitrators
that allow the parties to accurately evaluate the risk of partiality
themselves, ADR will not reach its potential as a more accessible and
equally fair alternative to the court system. The Federal Arbitration Act
and several state statutes impose disclosure requirements on arbitrators,
but the issue of “evident partiality” arising from the potential economic
motivations of arbitrators has rarely been examined by the courts. The
Ninth Circuit’s ruling has put the spotlight on the need for arbitrators to
disclose any potential financial interest or stake they may have in the
outcome of an action.
While the issue had not received much attention prior to Monster
Energy, there has been growing concern in the legal community over the
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potential abuse and partiality permitted under the current disclosure
requirements for arbitrators, particularly in light of the surge in
arbitration clauses, and the disparate economic influence wielded by
“repeat players” in the arbitration system. Given the private nature of
ADR providers, it is to be expected that the rules applicable to
arbitrators differ from Article III judges. However, as discussed in
Monster Energy and Justice White’s concurring opinion in
Commonwealth Coatings, parties to an arbitration should be made
aware of all of the arbitrator’s non-trivial business dealings that may
hinder the fairness of the process, including whether there are any
financial incentives that might cause a reasonable party concern that an
arbitrator could favor one party over another. Arbitration will continue
to grow in popularity, highlighting the need to establish strict and
unambiguous disclosure requirements to enable all participants in
arbitration to evaluate the economic interests of potential arbitrators,
and to minimize the risks of bias in such proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal disputes are a familiar concept to many Americans, but the
variety of methods employed to solve them is evolving, requiring a
closer look at how these alternative methods may impact the integrity of
the dispute resolution system. Despite what popular television shows
and movies may suggest, real life litigation rarely takes place inside a
courtroom. The vast majority of legal disputes are resolved without a
trial.1 A growing number of these disputes are being settled outside of
the court system entirely, in the form of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR).2 There are several types of ADR, but they all generally involve
bringing in a neutral third party to help bring about a resolution with less
time and resources expended at trial.3
As legal disputes trend away from the court system and towards
arbitration and other forms of ADR,4 the role and potential bias of the
third party involved in the dispute resolution must be considered. In
many jurisdictions, it has not been clear whether an arbitrator is subject
to the same or similar rules of disclosure and recusal as trial judges,
creating a growing need for clarity as to how the courts ought to
approach the issue and what types and level of disclosure parties should
expect from potential arbitrators. One of the most pertinent issues
affecting potential arbitrators is Repeat Player Bias, which refers to the
symbiotic relationship between an arbitrator and a repeat customer of
their services, leading to the potential for an arbitrator to favor this repeat
player for business purposes at the expense of the other party to the
dispute.5 In Monster Energy Company v. City Beverages,6 the Ninth
Circuit provided meaningful guidance as to the nexus between the
generalized disclosure requirements for arbitrators and the particular
impact of Repeat Player Bias.7 The court vacated an arbitration award
because the arbitrator had failed to disclose that he had a “substantial”
1. Government survey shows 97 percent of civil cases settled, PHX. BUS. J. (May 27,
2004), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/05/31/newscolumn5.html (citing a
U.S. Justice Department study of state courts) (“About 97 percent of civil cases are settled or
dismissed without a trial.”).
2. Bradley A. Kletscher, Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) Trends: The Growth
and Prevalence of ADR in Litigation, BARNA, GUZY & STEFFEN LTD. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2009),
https://www.bgs.com/blog/2009/12/13/alternative-dispute-resolution-adr-trends-the-growthand-prevalence-of-adr-in-litigation/ [hereinafter ADR Trends].
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Drew J. Hushka, How Nice to See You Again: The Repetitive Use of
Arbitrators and the Risk of Evident Partiality, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 325 (2013),
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=arbitrationlawreview.
6. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019).
7. See id.
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ownership interest in the ADR provider in that case, and that provider
had “nontrivial” past business dealings with one of the litigants (Monster
Energy).8
This Article aims to highlight the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Monster Energy, and to discuss its significance to the legal profession
and potential litigants. In Part II, this Article will give a brief overview
of the growth of arbitration in the United States, the general disclosure
and conflict rules applicable to arbitrators, and the factual background
of Monster Energy. Parts III and IV will discuss the issue of Repeat
Player Bias and analyze the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in the case. Part V
will suggest that a strict standard for required disclosures of arbitrators,
similar to the Ninth Circuit’s in Monster Energy, should be applied
universally and unambiguously through state law and court rulings to
ensure fairness in arbitration proceedings and to give parties the tools
necessary to provide adequately informed consent to the resolution of
their disputes outside of the court system. While this Article addresses
ADR generally, emphasis will be placed on arbitration in civil cases for
the sake of simplicity and relevance to the Monster Energy case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Alternative Dispute Resolution?
ADR is generally defined as any attempt to resolve a legal dispute
outside of court.9 While accurate, this definition fails to paint a clear
picture of what that process actually looks like. Technically, even a oneoff offer to settle could be considered a form of ADR given that it is a
form of negotiation aimed at resolving the dispute. As a direct
alternative to trial, ADR is generally voluntary for all parties involved
and a neutral third party will be brought in to promote impartiality.10
ADR exists in many forms, each with its own process and nuance.
Two of the most common types of ADR are mediation and arbitration.11
This Article will focus on arbitration because it is one of the few forms
of ADR in which the third-party neutral may have the power to render a
binding adjudication of the parties’ dispute, so that the risks of potential
bias, and the parties’ resulting interests in procuring full and accurate
disclosures, are most acute.
8. See id. at 1132, 1135-36.
9. What is ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION?, L. DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/alternative-dispute-resolution/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
10. Id.
11. ADR Types & Benefits, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2021).
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Although both mediation and arbitration involve a third-party
neutral to assist with the dispute, they differ in the specific role and
function of the third-party neutral.12 Where a mediator will simply
facilitate discussion between the parties, an arbitrator or a panel of
multiple arbitrators will ultimately decide the outcome of the dispute.13
In this sense, arbitration proceedings operate similarly to trial. The
arbitrator(s) hear arguments from both sides, and the parties may submit
evidence for the arbitrator to consider.14 While there are some
similarities to trial, the arbitration process differs by operating less
formally and by loosening the rules of evidence for the sake of
efficiency.15 In addition, the effect of the arbitrator’s decision may
operate differently from a judge or jury’s decision at trial.16
An arbitration proceeding can be “binding” or “nonbinding.”17 In
the typical binding arbitration, the parties agree to accept the arbitrator’s
decision as final,18 and the right to appeal the substance of that decision
is extremely limited.19 In other types of arbitrations, the parties may
agree that the arbitrator’s decision is not binding.20 In those matters,
either party may reject the decision and proceed to trial.21 Binding
arbitration is best for those who wish to avoid the formality, time, and
cost of trial.22 For both types of arbitration, litigants are given the
opportunity to select a decision maker who possesses more specialized
knowledge in a particular area of the law or other subject matter that
makes them a better fit to adjudicate the dispute.23
Other forms of ADR, such as neutral evaluation and settlement
conferences, each contain their own benefits and drawbacks when
compared to their counterparts,24 but arbitration best exemplifies the
alluring features of ADR, and has generated a significant amount of trust
and practice of ADR nationwide.25
12. Id.
13. ADR Types & Benefits, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. ADR Types & Benefits, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Linda L. Beyea, Select the Right Arbitrator for Your Case, AAA-ICDR® BLOG (Dec.
10, 2019), https://adr.org/blog/select-the-right-arbitrator-for-your-case.
24. See id.
25. See generally Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What’s the Difference?, FIND
L., https://www.findlaw.com/adr/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigation-whats-thedifference.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2019).
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1. Prevalence
The growth of ADR is likely the culmination of many contributing
factors, but its appeal stems largely from its lower cost, less daunting
procedures compared to its trial counterpart, the parties’ freedom to
choose the arbitrator(s) and create their own schedule, and the desire to
avoid a jury panel and class actions. Although ADR in its basic form is
not a new concept, its mainstream use began in response to the litigation
explosion of the past few decades.26
In an attempt to address growing caseloads and a lack of resources,
courts began to promote ADR to lessen the burden placed on them.27
Consequently, ADR is often viewed as a more efficient alternative for
the parties involved, while reducing case overload for courts thanks to
ADR proliferation.28 Even the United States Courts’ website encourages
the use of ADR, asserting that it saves both parties unnecessary expense
and delay.29
One of the key features of ADR is that it may be used in conjunction
with litigation.30 Not only is this potentially advantageous for parties to
a dispute, it is also in the interest of the courts to have prospective
litigants attempt to resolve their dispute before calling upon the often
limited resources of the court system to resolve it.31 In response, some
courts, bar associations, and state legislatures have begun providing
ADR resources or requirements to promote the use of ADR before
commencing trial.32
For example, the Santa Clara County Superior Court website
contains an “ADR Resources” page that includes: a list of local ADR
providers, a phone number and email address to inform and prepare
parties for ADR, contact information for free mediation services in some
types of disputes, and additional links to other resources.33 Not only is
26. ADR Trends, supra note 2.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/typescases/civil-cases (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) (“To avoid the expense and delay of having a
trial, judges encourage the litigants to try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute. The
courts encourage the use of mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, designed to produce a resolution of a dispute without the need for trial or other
court proceedings.”).
30. Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25.
31. See Miranda Blue, In Overcrowded Courts, Justice Delayed, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.pfaw.org/blog-posts/in-overcrowded-courts-justice-delayed/.
32. See, e.g., Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25; see also ADR
Resources,
SUPERIOR
C T.
CAL.
COUNTY
SANTA
CLARA,
https://www.scscourt.org/self_help/civil/adr/adr_resources.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2021)
[hereinafter Santa Clara County ADR Resources].
33. Santa Clara County ADR Resources, supra note 32.
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it commonplace to find a plethora of ADR resources online that make
the process easier for potential litigants, some jurisdictions require or
strongly encourage participation in ADR before allowing a case to be
heard at trial.34 Florida requires parties in a wide variety of legal disputes
to attempt to reach a resolution through mediation or arbitration before
they can begin trial.35 With the numerous benefits arbitration provides
for litigants and the legal system, it will likely continue growing.
2. Making Sense of the Numbers
All signs indicate that there is a strong likelihood ADR will, at the
very least, remain an effective and more accessible alternative to
litigation. But just how common is ADR? Statistics are frequently
thrown around regarding the percentage of cases that settle or go to trial,
but it can be difficult to generate precise numbers. A common
misconception is that about ninety-five percent of cases settle, but,
despite the significant variation among research methods, a more
accurate estimate is that about two-thirds of civil cases settle.36 The
remarkably high rate does not come from settlement rates but is instead
based on the number of cases that go to trial in the first place.37
Some of the more telling statistics are those involving case filings.
While reliable statistics concerning the number of cases that settle are
hard to come by,38 the number of case filings in the U.S. is well
documented.39 The number of cases filed in state trial courts increased
steadily into the mid-2000s.40 Following the 2008 economic crisis,
average case filings increased at a more rapid pace.41 However, this
trend was short-lived, declining at an average of three point five percent
for the next several years.42 The number of case filings between 2014

34. See, e.g., Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25.
35. F.S.A. § 718.1255 (West 2020).
36. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care? 6 CORNELL L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 111, 112, 115 (2009).
37. John Barkai et al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 AM. JUDGES ASS’N CT. REV. 34, 34
(2006), https://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr42-3and4/CR42-3BarkaiKentMartin.pdf (“Many
commentators start with an accurate picture of low, single-digit trial rates (typically 2%-3%),
but then they inappropriately assume the inverse—namely, that all the remaining cases are
settled.”).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/29818/2015-EWSC.pdf
[hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS].
40. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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and 2019 were much more erratic, but the population-adjusted numbers
still appear to be going down.43
Some argue that one of the main driving forces behind the growth
of ADR stems from the pervasiveness of mandatory arbitration clauses.44
An arbitration clause is defined as “[a] clause inserted in a contract
providing for compulsory arbitration in case of dispute as to [rights] or
liabilities under it.”45 In essence, an arbitration clause requires the
parties to a contract containing the clause to participate in arbitration
should any legal dispute arise out of the terms of the contract.46 While
arbitration clauses cannot constitute waiver of a court’s jurisdiction
entirely, they nonetheless may significantly limit one’s ability to resolve
the dispute at trial.47 One of the primary uses of arbitration clauses is
insertion into employment contracts.48 Employers may be inclined to
include arbitration clauses in their employment contracts in recognition
of, and in response to, the ability to control their employment disputes
in an environment that gives them a better chance of obtaining a
favorable outcome.49 For example, California has one of the highest
rates of arbitration clauses in employment contracts and also has an
employee-protective legal structure.50
Given that many arbitration clauses in employment contracts
involve opting out of the state court system, the inference is that one of
the primary motivations in including arbitration clauses in employment
contracts is to nullify many of the legal protections employees would
otherwise have, including the right to a jury trial.51 This practice by
43. See U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS – NATIONAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD
PROFILE,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2019.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021); see also National Population Totals and Components of Change:
2010-2019,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
44. See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf; see also Daniel
T. Pascucci, Dissecting Common Basic Arbitration Clauses – You Can Build a Better One,
MINTZ (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2196/2018-03dissecting-common-basic-arbitration-clauses-you-can-build.
45. What
is
ARBITRATION
CLAUSE?,
L.
DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/arbitration-clause/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
46. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 1.
47. What is ARBITRATION CLAUSE?, supra note 45.
48. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 7.
51. See id. at 12 (“Rather than having their rights adjudicated through the public courts
and decided by juries of their peers, more often now American workers have to bring claims
. . . through arbitral forums designated by agreements that their own employers drafted and
required them to agree to as a condition of employment.”).
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employers has received criticism for its unfair treatment of employees
due to the complexity and prevalence of arbitration clauses in the
employment contracts of large-scale employers, limiting people’s ability
to avoid and understand them.52 Employers might counter by arguing
that they include arbitration clauses in their employment contracts for
promoting efficiency and decreasing the costs for all parties involved, to
the disadvantage of no one.53 Regardless of the reason, the frequent
inclusion of arbitration clauses in employment contracts has attracted a
greater amount of attention to ADR, and followed with implementation
of several restrictions regarding their use with the possibility of
additional restrictions in the future.54 The pervasiveness of mandatory
arbitration clauses is a separate major source of debate within the legal
community that deserves its own discussion, but is nonetheless worth
introducing here to provide a better understanding of how ADR directly
impacts litigation in the United States.55
In any event, there is no question that arbitration is more prevalent
now than before, and that trend does not appear to be changing anytime
soon.56 However, as the popularity of arbitration grows, so too does the
risk of abuse and prejudice.57
B. Evolution of Arbitration
Having discussed ADR with a focus on arbitration, its forms, and
its prevalence, the next step is to consider the arbitrators themselves:
who are they? Where do they come from? What rules govern their
selection?
1. Who Are the Main Service Providers?
The demand for legal experts to resolve disputes through ADR has
led to the formation of numerous ADR service providers.58 There is a

52. See generally id.
53. See Pascucci, supra note 44.
54. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 12.
55. In-depth discussion of arbitration clauses is beyond the scope of this Article.
56. Alternative
Dispute
Resolution,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last updated June 8, 2017)
(“As burgeoning court queues, rising costs of litigation, and time delays continue to plague
litigants, more states have begun experimenting with ADR programs.”).
57. See generally Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2021).
58. See, e.g., JAMS, jamsadr.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); AM. ARB. ASS’N, adr.org
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021); CPR, https://www.cpradr.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
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rapidly growing list of ADR service providers,59 but the three most
commonly used service providers in the country are the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention & Resolution (CPR), and JAMS.60 Of these three
organizations, two are non-profit.61 AAA and CPR each operate as nonprofit organizations, which makes JAMS unique among its competitors
by operating as a for-profit business.62 Collectively, these organizations
have handled thousands of cases and employ hundreds of full-time thirdparty neutrals.63 Despite the significant collective market share of the
three largest organizations, there is enough demand for ADR neutrals in
the market to support many other service providers as well.64 Still, in
comparison to the three, other providers are typically much smaller and
are less equipped to handle the volume and variety of ADR services than
the three aforementioned ones.65 As a result, the big three are the
preferred providers for many of the nation’s largest businesses.66
2. Rules Applicable to Arbitrators
The rules and procedures of arbitration may differ from trial, and at
times are far looser, but arbitration is nonetheless subject to its own
restrictions.67 One of the notable differences is that anyone can be an
arbitrator, with or without a law degree or legal expertise, which is a
stark departure from the requirements of judgeship.68 While this is
generally the case, there are situations in which an arbitrator must meet
specific subject matter qualifications that do not apply to judges.69
For example, in the context of mandatory arbitration clauses, the
clause may stipulate that an arbitrator must come from a particular pool

59. See
Dispute
Resolution
Rosters
List,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DR_Rosters_List/
(last
visited Apr. 26, 2021).
60. See David McLean, US Arbitral Institutions and Their Rules, LATHAM & WATKINS
LLP, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/us-arbitral-institutions-and-their-rules (last
visited Apr. 26, 2021).
61. See CPR, supra note 58; About the AAA and ICDR, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/about (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
62. See CPR, supra note 58; see About the AAA and ICDR, supra note 61.
63. See McLean, supra note 60, at 1.
64. See JUNE R. LEHRMAN & EDITH C. SCHAFFER, CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS BUS.
TRANSACTIONS § 14:4 (2020).
65. See generally Dispute Resolution Rosters List, supra note 59.
66. See id.
67. See Pascucci, supra note 44.
68. See Ken LaMance, Who Can Be an Arbitrator?, LEGALMATCH,
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/choosing-an-arbitrator.html (last updated
Apr. 18, 2018, 2:34 PM).
69. Id.
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of candidates with relevant expertise relating to the nature of the
dispute.70 Non-lawyers are technically qualified to conduct certain kinds
of arbitration,71 and the parties to a dispute may prefer an arbitrator with
a specific type of expertise.72 One of the potential benefits of arbitration
over trial is that an arbitrator is selected and agreed upon by both parties,
allowing them to choose an arbitrator they believe is equipped to
understand and adequately adjudicate their dispute.73 Conversely, the
greater level of randomness in the selection of judges that will hear a
case may create a more neutral environment.74
In sum, the process for selecting an arbitrator is ultimately up to the
parties to the dispute.75 Rather than relying on longstanding, more
fastidious rules such as those applicable to trial, the parties to an
arbitration are the masters of their own proceeding and are free to
manage it in any way they see fit.76
i. Rules of ADR Service Providers
Although the rules of arbitration are ultimately up to the parties,
many ADR service providers have established their own rules applicable
to all arbitrations conducted by their organization.77 Presumably, this
streamlines the process and allows prospective customers to review the
details of the process before formally beginning the proceedings or
selecting an ADR service provider.78 As an illustration, the JAMS
website devotes an entire homepage tab to rules and clauses for their
ADR services.79 Under JAMS’ rules and clauses options, they provide
detailed information regarding their general rules of arbitration.80

70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See What is Arbitration?, FIND L., https://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/what-isarbitration-.html (last updated June 20, 2016) (“Arbitrators can also be required to be experts
in the field or industry involved in a dispute, whereas a judge may or may not have such
expertise. On the flip side, some would suggest that this randomness and lack of selection is
a plus for litigation, as judges have no reason to worry about whether they will ever be ‘picked’
to decide another case for the parties before them.”).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., JAMS ADR Rules & Clauses, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/adr-rulesprocedures/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); What We Do, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://adr.org/arbitration (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); Arbitration, CPR,
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/arbitration (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
78. See id.
79. See JAMS Rules & Clauses, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/adr-rules-procedures/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
80. See id.
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JAMS’ comprehensive arbitration is subject to thirty-four rules,81
compared to the twenty-eight rules listed for their streamlined arbitration
format.82 The rules cover topics ranging from service requirements to
sanctions, resembling the rules of civil procedure for the courts in many
ways.83 While many of the JAMS arbitration rules cover similar issues
as rules of civil procedure, they are clearly dwarfed by both number and
depth when compared to rules of civil procedure.84 Certainly, one of the
major benefits of arbitration is its simplified process,85 and the JAMS
rules seem to support that notion. However, this simplification comes at
the cost of certain rights and protections that exist for litigants.86
The well-established process used in JAMS arbitrations, along with
the similar processes practiced by other large ADR providers,87 is likely
one of the driving forces behind the success of the top ADR service
providers.88 In fact, a substantial portion of the JAMS rules cover
arbitration clauses.89 This is unsurprising given the vast number of
arbitrations that organizations like JAMS manage that stem from
arbitration clauses.90
Organizations like JAMS handle such a large number of
arbitrations that some parties are bound to dispute the outcome. JAMS
has several rules in place to address this.91 First, JAMS has an informal
appeal process for arbitration awards.92 However, the JAMS appeal
process is vastly different from the rules of appeal in civil procedure.93
81. See JAMS, JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2014),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf.
82. See JAMS, JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2014),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_streamlined_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf.
83. See id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. (establishing the process parties and courts must follow
when engaging in or conducting civil litigation.).
84. JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 82; cf. FED.
R. CIV. P.
85. See ADR Types and Benefits, supra note 11.
86. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 38 (right to a jury); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (judgement as a
matter of law); FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (new trial).
87. See, e.g., Rules, Forms & Fees, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/Rules (last
visited Apr. 26, 2021).
88. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.
2019).
89. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81.
90. See Consumer Case Information, JAMS,
https://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
91. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81.
92. JAMS, JAMS OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE (2003),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_Optional_Appeal_Procedures-2003.pdf.
93. See id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (summons).
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The most noteworthy difference is that an appeal of a JAMS arbitration
award is optional, requiring the consent of both parties before it may be
processed.94 This hardly resembles an appeal process, and the ability to
appeal an arbitration award is extremely limited at best.95
Second, JAMS provides no procedure for vacating an arbitration
award.96 Rather than providing customers an opportunity to seek vacatur
of the arbitration award, JAMS relies on the applicable state and federal
rules of vacatur.97
Finally, the JAMS arbitration rules list few disclosure requirements
for its arbitrators.98 The rules mainly specify the manner in which the
disclosures will be made, and only briefly mention disclosures “required
by law.”99 Not only is this provision ambiguous, it is also unclear
whether the disclosures “required by law” will be made at all.100 The
provision follows “required by law” with the language, “or within ten
(10) calendar days . . . .”101 In addition to the confusing and disjunctive
disclosure requirements applicable to the arbitrator, the parties and their
representatives are required to disclose any risks that are likely to cause
impartiality on the part of the arbitrator.102 Curiously, the rules appear
to put the brunt of the disclosure requirements on the parties themselves,
even with respect to the risk of the arbitrator’s own impartiality.103
Given the limitations of JAMS’ rules of arbitration, parties may
only have the ability to challenge an arbitration award through preexisting law, such as statutes, rules of civil procedure, and Canons of
Judicial Ethics.104
94. See JAMS OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE, supra note 92, at 3.
95. See id.
96. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81,
at 29-30.
97. See id. at 29 (“Proceedings to enforce, confirm, modify or vacate an Award will be
controlled by and conducted in conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec 1,
et seq., or applicable state law. The Parties to an Arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed
to have consented that judgment upon the Award may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.”).
98. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81,
at 17 (“Any disclosures regarding the selected Arbitrator shall be made as required by law or
within ten (10) calendar days from the date of appointment.”).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. (“Any disclosures regarding the selected Arbitrator shall be made as required by
law or within ten (10) calendar days from the date of appointment.”).
102. See id. at 17-18 (“The Parties and their representatives shall disclose to JAMS any
circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the Arbitrator’s impartiality or
independence, including any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the
Arbitration or any past or present relationship with the Parties or their representatives.”).
103. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81.
104. See id. at 17-18; see, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 638 (2003); Code of Conduct for
United States Judges, at canon 2, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-
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ii. Rules for Vacating an Arbitration Award
Even without the opportunity to seek a correction or vacatur of an
arbitration award through the arbitration service provider’s rules, parties
may take advantage of both federal and state statutes that do give them
that opportunity.105 Specifically, the Federal and California rules each
provide a basis for correcting or overturning an arbitration award—albeit
on a much more limited basis than is available through appeals of trial
court rulings.106 California requires arbitrators to disclose “all matters
that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be
impartial.”107 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides grounds for
vacatur of an arbitration award when there is “evident partiality.”108
When applied, the federal rule requires arbitrators to disclose any facts
“that might create an impression of possible bias.”109 Functionally, both
rules are similar but not identical.110
Generally, a district court must “take the award as it finds it,” with
only a limited ability to vacate or modify the award.111 There is a general
rule of deference when an arbitration award is brought before the
court.112 However, courts have nonetheless been willing to vacate or
modify arbitration awards on the basis of evident partiality.113
3. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages
The evolution of ADR and the challenges it raises are well
exemplified in the Ninth Circuit’s recent Monster Energy case.114 This
case involved a dispute between Monster Energy Company (Monster)
united-states-judges#c (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) (“Respect for Law. A judge should respect
and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
105. See Procedures and Grounds for Requesting a U.S. District Court to Correct an
Arbitration Award or Vacate an Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
WOLFF L. OFF. (2013), https://www.wolfflaw.com/procedures-and-grounds-for-requestinga-u-s-district-court-to-co.html [hereinafter Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration
Award].
106. See id.
107. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
108. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
109. See Commonwealth Coatings Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
110. See Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105 (“The
grounds for a Court to vacate or correct an Arbitration Award are similar-but not identicalunder the California and Federal Arbitration Acts.”).
111. Legion Ins. Corp. v. VCW, Inc., 198 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1999).
112. See Teamsters Local 853 v. J.C. Paper, Nos. C-09-04671 EDL, C-08-2464 EDL.,
2010 WL 625354, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
113. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th
Cir. 2019); Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
114. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
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and City Beverages, doing business as Olympic Eagle Distributing
(Olympic Eagle).115 In 2006, Olympic Eagle signed a twenty year
contract with Monster, under which Olympic Eagle would promote and
sell Monster products.116 The contract included a provision that allowed
Monster to terminate the agreement without cause, provided they pay
Olympic Eagle a severance fee.117 Monster terminated the contract
before the conclusion of the contractual period, leading Olympic Eagle
to use Washington state law in an attempt to prohibit Monster’s
termination without cause.118
In response, Monster compelled
arbitration of the dispute through the arbitration clause included in its
contracts with distributors.119 The arbitration clause designated JAMS
Orange County as the administrator of the arbitration.120 Upon the
commencement of the mandatory arbitration proceedings, JAMS
provided both parties with a list of seven arbitrators to choose from.121
After the parties agreed on a candidate, the arbitrator provided a
disclosure statement.122 The arbitrator’s disclosure statement said, in
part:
I practice in association with JAMS. Each JAMS neutral, including
me, has an economic interest in the overall financial success of
JAMS. In addition, because of the nature and size of JAMS, the
parties should assume that one or more of the other neutrals who
practice with JAMS has participated in an arbitration, mediation or
other dispute resolution proceeding with the parties, counsel or
insurers in this case and may do so in the future.123

Following the completion of arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator
ruled in favor of Monster and awarded attorneys’ fees.124 Soon after,
Monster sought to confirm the award.125 In response, Olympic Eagle
petitioned for vacatur on the basis of its later discovery that the arbitrator
was a co-owner of JAMS.126 In addition, Olympic Eagle requested
information about the arbitrator’s financial interest in JAMS and
Monster’s relationship with JAMS.127 Initially unsuccessful in its
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1132-33.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
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discovery request, Olympic Eagle served JAMS with a subpoena before
the dispute was eventually brought before a federal district court.128 The
district court confirmed the arbitration award and awarded Monster
attorneys’ fees.129 Olympic Eagle appealed the court’s decision,
bringing the case before the Ninth Circuit.130 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit found that the arbitrator failed to disclose his ownership interest
in JAMS,131 in violation of federal law.132 The court based its decision
on the grounds that the arbitrator’s ownership interest in JAMS, in
conjunction with JAMS’ extensive business history with Monster,
established a “reasonable impression of bias.”133
The Ninth Circuit’s reversal and grant of vacatur in this case has
the potential to significantly impact the practice of ADR.134 Monster
Energy is one of the few cases to address the paradox of Repeat Player
Bias.135 If Monster Energy is any indication, it appears that, at the very
least, rules of impartiality will be more strictly enforced in the future.136
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The central issues that the Ninth Circuit set out to address in
Monster Energy involved an arbitrator’s disclosure obligations and the
risk of Repeat Player Bias.137 The Repeat Player Effect is, in part, the
notion that frequent customers of an ADR service provider have an
inherent advantage over a non-repeat opposing party to the
proceeding.138 The prevalence of arbitration clauses within employment
and business contracts calls for a closer look into the fairness of ADR in
those environments.139 Given the rapid growth of ADR and arbitration
clauses, it is not surprising to believe that businesses have been
128. See id.
129. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1138.
132. See Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105 (stating
that courts have statutory authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) to vacate an arbitration award
“where there was evident partiality . . . in the arbitrators.”).
133. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1138.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1134.
136. See id. at 1141-42 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 1138.
138. See Edward Silverman, The Suspicious Existence of the “Repeat Player Effect” in
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, NAT. L. REV. (2013),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/suspicious-existence-repeat-player-effect-mandatoryarbitration-employment-disputes.
139. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking
the
Deck
of
Justice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stackingthe-deck-of-justice.html.
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motivated to include arbitration clauses in their contracts because they
receive benefits from partaking in arbitration as opposed to trial.140
While there is an argument to be made that the benefits from arbitration
clauses equally apply to both parties, the existence of Repeat Player Bias
may tip the scales in the favor of one party over the other.141
In determining the risk of impartiality in arbitration proceedings,
the nature of the relationship between arbitrators and the parties to the
dispute is an important consideration.142 The financial interest the
arbitrator has in his associated business is also relevant.143 While these
factors provide some guidance in determining the risk of evident
partiality, there is no bright-line rule when applying these factors to the
facts.144 Given the fact-specific requirements for a finding of evident
partiality resulting in vacatur, many parties subject to an arbitration
clause are unsure of their rights and potential remedies should they find
themselves arbitrating against the other party to the contract.145 Despite
the Ninth Circuit in Monster Energy recently laying out the requirements
for vacating an arbitration award on the basis of evident partiality more
clearly, it has yet to be seen whether the current rules and the extent of
their enforcement go far enough to ensure adequacy and fairness in ADR
proceedings.146
IV. ANALYSIS
The court’s holding in Monster Energy provides substantial
guidance for applying the Federal Arbitration Act.147 The FAA’s text,
stating that vacatur of an award is proper “where there was evident
partiality . . . in the arbitrators,” hardly establishes a pragmatic solution
to the risk of arbitrator partiality.148
This section will first discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Monster
Energy.149 Second, this section will consider whether the court correctly

140. See id. (“By inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of
consumer and employment contracts, companies like American Express devised a way to
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits,
realistically the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices.”).
141. See id.; see also Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134.
142. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1138.
143. Id. at 1136.
144. See Kathryn A. Windsor, Defining Arbitrator Evidentiary Partiality: The Catch-22
of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191, 198-99 (2009).
145. See Silverman, supra note 138.
146. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135.
147. See id. at 1133-34, 1135-38.
148. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
149. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132.
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applied the rules of vacatur,150 and evaluate whether the rules sufficiently
address major concerns surrounding arbitration proceedings.151
A. The Ninth Circuit Rationale in Monster Energy
In Monster Energy, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
Federal Arbitration Act152 permitted a court to vacate the arbitration
award resulting from the dispute between Monster Energy and Olympic
Eagle.153 Olympic Eagle argued that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose
his ownership interest in JAMS supported vacatur of the award, whereas
Monster contended that Olympic Eagle waived its impartiality claim by
failing to timely object following its receipt of the arbitrator’s
disclosures.154
In addressing Monster’s waiver claim, the court applied a
constructive knowledge standard155 to consider whether a party had
waived an evident partiality claim.156 The court previously found that
failure to request disclosures may constitute waiver.157 However, the
court distinguished this case from others by characterizing the
arbitrator’s disclosure statement as a “partial disclosure.”158 The court
acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ownership interest was, in fact, a type
of economic interest, and the arbitrator had explicitly disclosed his
general economic interest in JAMS.159 However, the arbitrator’s
disclosure of his general economic interest did not constitute
constructive notice of his potential non-neutrality.160 The arbitrator’s
disclosure not only left out any indication of his ownership interest, but
likened his economic interest to the same interest of every other JAMS
neutral.161
In addition to mentioning his general economic interest in JAMS,
the arbitrator disclosed his own personal previous dealings with Monster
as a neutral.162 However, his disclosure also claimed that his economic
interest extended only to the matters where he had served as a neutral in
150. Id.; see also Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105.
151. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d. at 1133-38.
152. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
153. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132-34.
154. Id. at 1134.
155. Id.; see, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th
Cir. 2004).
156. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134.
157. See Fidelity Federal Bank, 386 F.3d at 1313.
158. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 1134-35.
161. See id.
162. Id.
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disputes involving Monster.163 That was inaccurate because, as a coowner of JAMS, the arbitrator received a direct economic benefit from
ADR services performed by other JAMS neutrals involving Monster.164
Monster argued that information relating to JAMS’ ownership structure
and case history were publicly available on the JAMS website.165
However, the JAMS website fails to provide clear and comprehensive
information answering Olympic Eagle’s initial questions.166 Regardless
of the public availability of information that may provide notice of a risk
of impartiality, the court emphasized “an arbitrator’s duty to investigate
and disclose potential conflicts.”167 Therefore, to expect Olympic Eagle
to have identified all relevant information that was not disclosed by the
arbitrator is to put the burden of the arbitrator’s own disclosures on the
parties.168 The court stated that a finding of waiver in this case would
“put a premium on concealment,” incentivizing arbitrator’s to withhold
information that may disqualify them.169
Turning to the evident partiality issue,170 the court looked to
Commonwealth Coatings171 in its analysis.172 That case required vacatur
of an arbitration award where the arbitrator failed to “disclose to the
parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.”173
On its face, this rule seems extremely broad.174 Adopting a more
narrowly tailored approach to the rule, the Ninth Circuit asserted that
“long past, attenuated, or insubstantial connections between a party and
an arbitrator” do not support vacatur on the basis of evident partiality.175
163. See id. at 1135.
164. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1136.
165. See Answering Brief of Appellee Monster Energy Co.—Under Seal at 33, 35, City
Beverages LLC v. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-55813).
166. See Consumer Case Information, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/
(last
visited
Apr.
28,
2021);
see
also
JAMS
Leadership,
JAMS,
https://www.jamsadr.com/jams-senior-management/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (illustrating
that, of the information available, none of it indicates the nature or extent of any JAMS
owners’ economic interest in the organization or its conducted arbitrations).
167. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135 (citing New Regency v. Nippon Herald Films,
501 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2007)).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
171. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
172. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135.
173. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149
(1968)). It is important to note that Commonwealth Coatings did not establish a standard for
“evident partiality” that received a majority vote, causing some circuits to implement the
standard from Justice Black’s plurality opinion and others to use Justice White’s concurring
opinion. Here, in the Monster Energy case, the Ninth Circuit pulls from elements of both
opinions.
174. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149.
175. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135.
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To reconcile the lack of clarity from the previously established rules, the
court synthesized them into a single, more manageable rule.176 This rule
states that, “to support vacatur of an arbitration award, the arbitrator’s
undisclosed interest in an entity must be substantial, and that entity’s
business dealings with a party to the arbitration must be nontrivial.”177
In essence, the court identified two requirements: (1) an arbitrator’s
undisclosed interest must be substantial, and (2) related business
dealings with a party must be nontrivial.178
In applying this rule to the facts of this case, the Ninth Circuit held
that both requirements were clearly met.179 Framed in the context of the
case, the court asked (1) “whether the Arbitrator’s ownership interest in
JAMS was sufficiently substantial,” and (2) “whether JAMS and
Monster were engaged in nontrivial business dealings.”180 The arbitrator
did disclose that he had previously served as a neutral arbitrator in a
dispute where Monster was a party, but nonetheless opted not to disclose
his ownership interest in the JAMS organization.181 This was significant
because the arbitrator’s status as a co-owner of JAMS entitled him to a
portion of profits across all JAMS arbitrations, not just the ones that the
arbitrator conducted himself.182 The court found that the arbitrator’s
ownership interest was substantial given that the interest “greatly
exceeds the economic interest that all JAMS neutrals naturally have in
the organization.”183
In addressing the second question regarding the trivial nature of
related business dealings, the court inquired about the Monster’s form
contracts.184 It found that each of Monster’s form contracts contained an
arbitration clause designating JAMS Orange County as the service
provider.185 Consequently, JAMS had administered ninety-seven
arbitrations for Monster as of October 2019, averaging over one
arbitration per month.186 The court labeled that level of business
interaction as clearly nontrivial.187
176. See id. at 1135-36.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1136 (“Our inquiry is thus two-fold: we must determine (1) whether the
Arbitrator’s ownership interest in JAMS was sufficiently substantial, and (2) whether JAMS
and Monster were engaged in nontrivial business dealings. If the answer to both questions is
affirmative, then the relationship required disclosure, and supports vacatur.”).
179. See id. at 1132.
180. See id. at 1136.
181. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1136.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1136.
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On these grounds, the court found that the arbitrator had a
“substantial interest in [JAMS,] which has done more than trivial
business with [Monster].”188 This finding resulted in vacatur of the
arbitration award, noting that the facts created an impression of bias and
should have been disclosed.189
B. Application of Rules of Vacatur and Policy Rationale
The court’s application of the two-pronged analysis provides much
needed clarity and will likely serve as precedent for vacatur on the basis
of partiality in future cases involving similar facts.190 This test fits neatly
within the “evident partiality” framework provided by Commonwealth
Coatings,191 and only serves to supplement its application.192
Although the Monster Energy case formally addresses only the
federal rules, the court allotted a sizeable portion of its holding to a
discussion of comparable rules of vacatur at the state level.193 In its
discussion, the court mentioned the rules adopted by several states
within its jurisdiction.194 One focus centered on the state rules’
comparisons with judge disqualification.195 For instance, the previously
mentioned California rule’s disclosure requirements include the
existence of any ground for disqualification of a judge.196 Montana’s
rule disclosure contains a similar requirement, stating that mandatory
disclosure requirements must include any ground for the disqualification
of a judge.197 In addition, the court mentions the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), which contains rules of arbitration that states
can and have chosen to adopt.198 RUAA “establishes a presumption of
evident partiality when the arbitrator does not disclose a ‘known, direct
and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a
known, existing and substantial relationship with a party . . . .’ ” 199
Under any of these rules, the JAMS arbitrator in Monster Energy would
be subject to even stricter disclosure rules.200

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
See id. at 1136.
See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132-38.
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
See generally Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135.
See id. at 1137-38.
See id. at 1136.
Id. at 1136-37.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2002).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-116(4)(a) (2019).
See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1137.
Id.
See generally id.
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As the court points out, the aforementioned state rules subject
arbitrators to disclosure rules that are “akin to, or more burdensome than,
the easily satisfied obligations we set forth here,” adding that “these
disclosure requirements safeguard the parties’ right to be aware of the
relevant information to assess the arbitrator’s neutrality.”201 The court’s
discussion of these alternative rules serves as an acknowledgement of
the prevalence of arbitration.202 Notably, in dicta, the court stated that
the United States has become an “arbitration nation.”203 As such, the
rules of arbitration must continue to be improved over time.
C. Sufficiency of the Rules
The rules of arbitration vary by jurisdiction, but some rules seem to
address the controversy surrounding arbitration with more clarity than
others.204 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Monster Energy provided much
needed clarity to the application of the Federal Arbitration Act and
related precedent.205 The lack of specificity in the FAA is certainly a
concern.206 There is significant room for varying interpretations of the
statute, as demonstrated by the split among the circuits in their specific
evident partiality standards.207 This lack of clarity is a concern for a
growing number of participants in arbitration and other forms of ADR.208
One possibility is that federal courts will establish enough
precedent in interpreting the FAA to create a more uniform
understanding and application of the rules. After all, the FAA is
certainly not the only statute with exceedingly broad provisions,209 and
laws must frequently evolve to address the particular subjects they are
designed to regulate. As such, there is an opportunity to either
supplement the FAA through case law or to amend it to provide greater

201. Id.
202. See id. at 1137-38.
203. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1130.
204. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5116(4)(a) (2019); Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1137.
205. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1133-38.
206. See, e.g., id.
207. See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44960.pdf; see also Seung-Woon Lee, Arbitrator’s Evident
Partiality: Current U.S. Standards and Possible Solutions Based on Comparative Reviews, 9
ARB.
L.
REV.
159
(2017),
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=arbitrationlawreview.
208. See generally SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 207.
209. See, e.g., Scott H. Greenfield, Haunted By Poorly Written Criminal Laws, SIMPLE
JUST. (Jul. 29, 2016), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2016/07/29/haunted-by-poorly-writtencriminal-laws/.
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context.210 Given that the FAA is roughly a century old and still lacks
the needed clarity, it may be time for the Supreme Court to hear a second
case involving the FAA’s evident partiality requirements, with
Commonwealth Coatings being the only one to date.211
D. Potential for Bias Following Monster Energy
Looking at the facts of Monster Energy, the potential for bias is
clear.212 When an arbitrator has an ownership interest in his ADR
organization, he directly benefits from the success of that
organization.213 That fact, in isolation, is not evidence of bias. But the
record in Monster Energy demonstrated that the profitability of JAMS,
and the arbitrator’s share of those profits, were tied directly to the
continuation of its ongoing and extensive business relationship with
Monster Energy.214 Based on the evidence in that case, JAMS neutrals
had handled no less than ninety-seven other arbitration proceedings to
which Monster Energy was a party in the preceding five years, an
average of at least one arbitration per month.215 That income was
generated only because Monster Energy had chosen to require JAMS as
the arbitration provider for any disputes arising under any of its
distributorship contracts.216 Considering the rates charged by JAMS and
the unusually high volume of such proceedings, the revenue produced
by JAMS’ relationship with Monster Energy was clearly substantial. As
the court noted, “[s]uch a rate of business dealing is hardly trivial,
regardless of the exact profit-share that the Arbitrator obtained.”217 That
share of profits would necessarily be jeopardized if Monster Energy
became dissatisfied with JAMS and decided to designate a different
provider in its arbitration clauses. Based on those facts, it is hardly
surprising that the court concluded: “these facts demonstrate that the
Arbitrator had a ‘substantial interest in [JAMS,] which has done more
than trivial business with [Monster]’—facts that create an impression of
bias, should have been disclosed, and therefore support vacatur.”218

210. See Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105.
211. It is again worth noting that Commonwealth Coatings did not establish a majority
standard for evident partiality under the FAA.
212. See generally Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1138-39
(9th Cir. 2019).
213. See id. at 1136.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
217. Id. at 1136.
218. Id.
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This is not to say that the arbitrator was incapable of serving as an
entirely unbiased neutral, but his ability to do so is not the relevant
question. Disclosure requirements are not meant to measure an
individual’s ability to remain neutral. Rather, such requirements exist to
allow the parties to evaluate the risk or appearance of partiality and
decide for themselves whether they want to attempt to mitigate that risk
by selecting another candidate.219 By withholding important information
regarding his position within JAMS, and JAMS’ relationship with
Monster, the arbitrator deprived Olympic Eagle of the opportunity to
conduct its own risk assessment.220
When comparing the FAA to several state statutes,221 it appears as
though some of these alternative rules plainly liken an arbitrator’s
disclosure requirements to a sitting judge’s disclosure requirements,
while still allowing appropriate experts to arbitrate.222 Presumably, this
similarity is in recognition of the significance of impartiality and the
analogous relationship between ADR and trial. ADR has served an
important purpose in the American legal system by being more
accessible than litigation and by mitigating the case overload that many
courts experience.223
However, in many instances the system falls short as an alternative
to litigation. One of the key aspects of the American judicial system is
its impartiality.224 It should be expected that participation in ADR
involves foregoing many of the rules and requirements applicable to
litigation, but the challenge seems to be striking the proper balance. For
ADR to maintain its current advantages over litigation the process must
continue to exist as a streamlined process. However, it is necessary to
put a limit on the extent to which ADR procedures disregard the careful
considerations of the judicial system. There are a variety of concerns
surrounding arbitration,225 but an overabundance of arbitrator
disclosures is not one of them.
There is a possibility that the concerns surrounding arbitration are
so deeply intertwined with the prevalence of arbitration clauses that any
solution that does not address the issue of arbitration clauses directly will
be insufficient. Although possible, this hardly justifies the complete
219. See id. at 1134.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 1136-38.
222. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-50
(1968); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-116(4)(a) (2019).
223. See ADR Trends, supra note 2.
224. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65
FLA. L. REV. 493 (2014).
225. E.g., Colvin, supra note 44.
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disregard of ADR rules that are indirectly related to arbitration clauses.
In fact, providing clearer grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award
would likely provide parties that are typically seen as “victims” of an
arbitration clause an opportunity to challenge the potentially biased
award.226 Besides, arbitration clauses are not the only source of
arbitrated disputes.227 Even if arbitration clauses were somehow limited,
or even eliminated altogether, arbitrations would still be the preferred
option for some parties.228 As such, there is more than enough reason to
address Repeat Player Bias through disclosure requirements to improve
the integrity of ADR as a whole.
V. PROPOSAL
The growing prevalence of arbitration, and the resulting increase in
the power and influence that repeat players can wield over the ADR
providers who depend on them for business, requires immediate action
by courts and legislatures to ensure that all litigants are provided with a
fair dispute resolution process.229 That objective could be accomplished
by imposing clear, unambiguous, and uniform standards for arbitrators,
comparable to those imposed on judges.
In order to accomplish that goal, and address the risks of potential
bias among third-party neutrals, the extent of an arbitrator’s disclosure
requirements must be explicit and thorough so that the parties may move
forward with confidence in the impartiality of the process.230 The rules
applicable to judges are meant to mitigate the risk of impartiality as
much as practicable, and there seems to be little reason why arbitrators

226. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 139.
227. See ADR Trends, supra note 2.
228. See generally Geyh, supra note 224.
229. The surest way to accomplish that goal would be to provide our court systems with
enough resources to efficiently manage any and all legal disputes, eliminating the need for
and attraction of private arbitration. But that prospect appears unlikely for obvious reasons.
230. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“Unlike the standards governing judges, however, our ruling in this case does not require
automatic disqualification or recusal—only disclosure prior to conducting an arbitration
concerning (1) the arbitrator’s ownership interest, if any, in the entity under whose auspices
the arbitration is conducted, and (2) whether the entity under whose auspices the arbitration
is conducted and one or more of the parties were previously engaged in nontrivial business
dealings. Once armed with that information, and the answers to any other inquiries the parties
may wish to pose as a result of knowing that information, the parties can make their own
informed decisions about whether a particular arbitrator is likely to be neutral. It is simplicity
itself, and no real burden, for an arbitrator to disclose his or her ownership interest in an
arbitration company for which he or she works, as well as the organization’s prior dealings
with the parties to the arbitration.”).
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should not be subject to a similar standard with respect to disclosures.231
For this reason, the Ninth Circuit was apt to recognize Justice White’s
concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings:
The arbitration process functions best when an amicable and trusting
atmosphere is preserved and there is voluntary compliance with the
decree, without need for judicial enforcement. This end is best
served by establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the outset,
through disclosure by the arbitrator of any financial transactions
which he has had or is negotiating with either of the parties . . . . The
judiciary should minimize its role in arbitration as judge of the
arbitrator’s impartiality. That role is best consigned to the parties,
who are the architects of their own arbitration process, and are far
better informed of the prevailing ethical standards and reputations
within their business.232

In applying Justice White’s rationale, arbitrators should be
uniformly required to disclose any information that any party might
reasonably believe contributes to a risk of impartiality, even if it strays
slightly from Justice White’s preferred, but underdeveloped standard.233
The Monster Energy decision highlights the critical importance of
establishing more rigorous and unambiguous standards for disclosure, as
arbitration becomes more prevalent and as ADR service providers
become more vulnerable to the power and influence of repeat players.
No party to a court proceeding need ever be concerned that a judge’s
salary is dependent on the outcome of the case.
Increasingly, private contractual arbitration is being used to resolve
disputes involving parties with markedly unequal bargaining power.234
Additionally, such disputes are being resolved by arbitrators with largely
unlimited authority, subject only to extremely limited review, and who
remain vulnerable to influences that may undermine the fairness that
should be expected from the legal system.235 In this system, the playing
field is not necessarily level when one party provides a significant
amount of income for the arbitrator or the provider for which they work,
while the other is a party that the arbitrator will likely never see again.236

231. See
generally
Model
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_o
f_judicial_conduct/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).
232. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1138.
233. See id.
234. See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 207, at 5.
235. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1130.
236. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of disclosure requirements for arbitrators has led to the
growing problem of evident partiality and Repeat Player Bias in ADR
proceedings. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC serves as a
significant, yet incomplete, contribution to address these problems.237
Although the rule the court adhered to is meant to provide some clarity
and guidance regarding a neutral arbitrator’s disclosure requirements
and the grounds for vacating an arbitration award, the court refrained
from harmonizing disclosure requirements of arbitrators with the
requirements applicable to judges.238 Considering ADR is generally
distinct from the court system in that it is conducted by private
individuals and organizations, the extent to which the risk of repeat
player bias can be mitigated is likely very limited. However, parties to
an arbitration should have the right to evaluate any risk of impartiality
themselves by having access to an arbitrator’s disclosures akin to those
required by judges. Until issues of evident partiality and Repeat Player
Bias garner more attention among courts and legislatures, the supposed
impartial nature of arbitrations will diminish as the industry continues to
grow.

237. See generally Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130.
238. See id. at 1137.

